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WomN AN THE LAW. By Leo Kanowitz. Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press. 1969. 312 pages.
I-HNRY H. FosTER, JR.*
A perspicacious observer of the contemporary scene has said that a highbrow is a man who has found something more interesting than women.1 Thus,
by definition, it would seem to follow that a preoccupation with civil -rights
and economic exploitation evinces lowbrow interests. However, women are
people, albeit of a very special kind, and a discussion of the legal status of
women should qualify as a middlebrow commitment. In Women and The Law,
Professor Leo Kanowitz has chosen to retain a scholarly interest in women
and to develop a passionate concern about how that jealous mistress, the law,
discriminates against them.
The dimension of women qua women Professor Kanowitz leaves to the
tender mercies of Simone de Beauvoir, 2 Betty Friedan,3 and Phyllis McGinley,4 who may be better equipped to discuss female frustrations and the identity crisis. His concern is characterized by his subtitle, "The Unfinished Revolution," and although the author does not incite to riot, he does offer sufficient
data and analysis to shame a male dominated legal order. In Chapter 2 he
deals with "Law and the Single Girl," and in Chapter 3 with "Law and the
Married Woman." Thereafter he gives a detailed critique of Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act 5 and the Equal Pay Act of 19630 and their inter-relationship. This is followed by a thorough analysis of the "Constitutional Aspects
of Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law" and the author's summary
and conclusions. There also are appendices of relevant statutes and recent
court decisions. The book and its organization is suitable for use as a text in
a seminar on women and the law.
Although Professor Kanowitz makes it clear that "you've come a long
way baby to get where you got today," he jolts us out of complacency by
noting many current instances of discrimination based on sex. The nineteenth
amendment, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the 1963 Equal Pay
Amendment, as well as supplementary state legislation, 7 have but limited
* Professor of Law, New York University.
1. The remark is attributed to Edgar Wallace.
2. THE SECOND SEx (1961).
3. THE FEim= MYSTIQuE (1963).
4.

SIxPENcE nr HER SHOE (1964).

5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. (1964). It is ironic that Congressman Howard Smith
appended Title VII to the 1964 Civil Rights Act in the hopes of killing the legislation and
that otherwise it probably would have taken several more years before federal legislation
outlawed discrimination based upon sex in industries subject to the federal commerce power.
See chap. 4.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1) (1964), amending section 6 of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938.
7. Prior to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, only two states, Hawaii and Wisconsin, had
prohibited sex discrimination in employment but by the beginning of 1968, 11 other jurisdictions had joined the ranks, including New York in 1965. See p. 107.
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coverage and are subject to evasion. In the early stages of its operation, over
one-third of the discrimination cases heard by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission were claims of discrimination in employment because of
sex. Despite the substantial body of administrative decisions that is being
developed under these statutes and the 1965 Presidential Executive Order
11,246 which forbids discrimination in government employment, there remain
many areas where women are singled out for unfair differentiation. For example, section 703(e) of Title VII excepts "bona fide occupational qualification" related to sex, and thus opens the door to invidious distinctions.
On the whole, Professor Kanowitz's book is comprehensive, readable,
and provocative. Especially valuable is his reasoning by analogy to equal
protection decisions involving racial discrimination. One finishes his book with
the conviction that social and legal discrimination against women is no more
tolerable in a civilized society than is racial discrimination. Furthermore, it
is somewhat shocking to realize that discrimination based on sex is taken for
granted by and continues to persist in our society. Lesser pay for the same
work remains the plight of a large percentage of the twenty-seven million
women in our labor market. We need only look at the legal profession to
appreciate the fact that a Portia rarely gets the emoluments and pay that
are provided for young Wall Street lawyers of the male gender.
If one is looking for something about the book to criticize, the most
obvious complaint is that Professor Kanowitz, in his enthusiasm to prove
discrimination de facto and de jure, makes a "federal case" out of statutes
and laws which are essentially protective rather than discriminatory. Thus,
discounting differences in maturation and slighting the special problems presented by a Lolita, he questions state statutes providing for a lower female
age of consent or age for marriage. Such differences in age of consent based
on sex, as well as the law pertaining to seduction and statutory rape, are not
calculated to penalize the female but to accord her special protection. In this
age of open sexual aggression, perhaps males should receive comparable solicitude, but there is no lobby to promote seduction and statutory rape laws to
protect teen-age boys and recent graduates from a Mrs. Robinson. In that
situation the venerable adage of volenti non fit injuria applies.
In addition to the more obvious examples of protective statutes, there
are other areas where the purpose is ostensibly protective, but due to the
total situation, one may suspect ulterior motives. Statutes limiting the hours
of work for women,8 or the weights they may lift,9 may perpetuate a male
monopoly of certain occupations. Similarly, statutes barring women from professional wrestling' 0 and bartending" may have a public morals and health
8. See p. 117 et. seq.
9. P. 114.
10. P. 129. See also Calzadilla v. Dooley, 29 A.D.2d 152, 286 N.Y.S.2d 510 (4th Dep't
1968).

11. Id. See also Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). It should be noted that a
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rationale but discriminatory consequences. Prostitution laws, where male customers commit no offense or escape prosecution, may occasion a practical
injustice although there may be no denial of equal protection where the classification is based on the difference between a professional and an amateur.
One also may regret that Women and The Law is rather skimpy on historical, sociological, and psychological materials and explanations. Its focus is
economic and legal, and there may be an excessive concern with equal protection problems at the expense of the insights and theories provided by the
social and behavioral sciences. It is a one dimensional rather than an eclectic
approach to a complex problem.
For example, another author might have preferred to note the thesis of
Sir Henry Maine that historically there is a movement from status to contract,
with the individual being substituted for the family as the unit with which
the law reckons,' 2 and the theory of James Bryce that patriarchial societies
evolve so that principles of female subordination are replaced by principles
of equality.' 3 Usually the break comes when women acquire the capacity to
inherit and hold property on a par with men. Thereafter other rights and
powers follow as a matter of course. Against the backdrop of such historical
generalizations, the legal status of wives from the Norman Conquest until
the Married Women's Property Acts of the nineteenth century could be measured. The combination of feudalism and the church not only instigated and
perpetuated a policy of discrimination which lasted seven hundred years but
also contaminated judicial thinking about women and the law up to the present
time. In the middle ages, learned theologians for years debated whether or
not women had souls, and the deification of Mary, which Henry Adams has
described so effectively,' 4 made mere mortal women ignominious by comparison-in much the same way that the knight's lady of romance made her
sister ugly by comparison. In short, placing women on a pedestal exposes feet
of clay.
The sociologists have also provided interesting insights into family relationships, role status, and social change. The anthropologists have disclosed
the infinite variety of customs and laws pertaining to women. Although Freud's
clinical observations regarding women may be passe, Erik Erikson has much
to say that is timely and significant.' 3 Therefore, in order to adequately document the "Unfinished Revolution," it is necessary to consult the social and
behavioral sciences. Although he does summarize the legal status of women
at common law, Professor Kanowitz, unfortunately, leaves the impression that
like topsy, the law surrounding women just grew.
few states, such as Arizona, Colorado, and Utah, bar women from the hazardous occupation of mining.
12. H. MAINE, AnwcMT LAW 163 (4th Am. ed. 1906).
13. J. B ',z, Marriage and Divorce under Roman and English Law, in HISTORY
AmD JuRIsPRuDENcE 842 (1901).

14. H. ADvrs, THE EDUCATION op HxxRY ADAss (1918).
15. See Emx H. EaimsoN, INSIOHT AwD R SPONSIILIT=Y (1964).
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The practitioner may find that the most valuable part of Women and
The Law is the legal analysis of federal legislation and constitutional issues.
Most of the relevant statutes and court decisions are treated in depth but
one must caution against the automatic transfer of principles evolved from
cases of racial discrimination to those where the discrimination is based on
sex. To some extent, sex is sui generis, the law of obscenity to the contrary
notwithstanding. Perhaps it is becoming modesty for the author to devote
more space to law than to 'women, and certainly the former may be more
knowable. There also is the male concern that females may abuse their independence and equality so that others than Portnoy will complain, and there
remains the suspicion that regardless of law, custom, or religion, many, if
not most, females always have been able to achieve their will or whim if they
cakred to make the effort. Finally, it is noteworthy that Professor Kanowitz
ignores the current discrimination against men and in favor of women in many
areas of family law, such as that pertaining to custody and alimony, where
only self-help by the-man evens things up so as to avert total subjugation. If
one places Women and The Law on the shelf next to A Generation of Vipers,
'perhaps a fair balance is struck.

